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RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS AND EURASIA
AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF RUSSIA’S ROLE IN 
EURASIAN INTEGRATION
Throughout history, Eurasia has been central to relations between Europe and 
Asia. It has been the crossroads of civilisations, contributing to the cultural 
and ethnic hybridity of the region. However, after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire and later the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, Eurasia lost 
its geostrategic importance in the US led liberal world order. In the 1920s, 
a group of Russian émigrés described the cultural and ethnic ties among 
the communities living across the vast Eurasian steppes as Eurasianism. 
Eurasianists divide the world into two opposing forces with Eurasianism 
including Russia and the European states favouring integration with it 
and Atlanticism including the US and European countries supporting an 
American led Atlantic order. Today, Russia is an important revisionist power 
in Eurasia, with huge stakes in the global order and the capability to help 
forge new relationships in the region.
SHAHZADA RAHIM ABBAS
INTRODUCTION
Eurasia has its own cultural and political uniqueness in historical discourse and as a purely geographical concept refers to the idea of a hybrid continent territorially stretching across Europe and Asia. (Mark Bassin, 
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“‘Classical’ Eurasianism and the Geopolitics of Russian Identity”, Ab Imperio, no2, 2003, pp257–66) On the 
greater Eurasian landmass, Turkey and Russia are the transcontinental countries 
with anthropological and imperial histories as regional powers. With the fall of 
the Ottoman Empire, Turkey embraced the Westernisation project and lost its 
Eurasian centrality. (Yang Cheng, “The Eurasian Moment in Global Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Great 
Power Strategies for Regional Integration” in Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (Eds), Eurasian Integration: The View 
from Within, New York: Routledge, 2015, pp274–90) With the ascension of the Bolsheviks in 1917, 
Russia maintained its Eurasian spirit in the form of the Soviet Union, creating 
an economic and political hybridity with the countries of Europe and Asia. 
(Karen Barkley and Mark von Hagen (Eds), After Empire: 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union 
and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, New York: 
Westview Press, 1997) For various historians, 
the victory of communism saved the 
country’s cultural uniqueness from the 
Ottoman fate. Arnold J Toynbee in 
his work A Study of History asserts that 
Russia by embracing communism in 
1917 saved its civilisation from being 
“arrested” by alien forces. According 
to him, Russia with its Orthodox 
Christianity identifies its cultural and 
ethnic genesis with Asia. Like the Sinic 
civilisation that experienced the full 
cycle of the alternating rhythm of “yin and yang”, Russia in the course of history 
has also undergone a period of “transfiguration and detachment”. The “yin–
yang” state is a particular form of general movement of “withdrawal and return” 
also known as “schism and palingenesia”. The word palingenesia is a Greek term 
meaning “recurrence or rebirth”. In a broader context, it refers to the “wheel 
of existence”, which Buddhist philosophy takes for granted, seeking a break by 
a withdrawal into nirvana. If nirvana does not end with actual rebirth then it 
diffuses into a supra-mundane state.
Since, the fall of the Soviet Union, several Russian intellectuals have been 
obsessed with revisionism to reclaim the historically derived distinctive nature 
of the Russian nation on the Eurasian landmass. Early Eurasianists formulated 
a different worldview about the country’s identity on the Eurasian landmass by 
emphasising a Russian civilisation as distinct from Western civilisation. (Peter J 
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With the ascension of the 
Bolsheviks in 1917, Russia 
maintained its Eurasian spirit 
in the form of the Soviet Union, 
creating an economic and political 
hybridity with the countries 
of Europe and Asia. Arnold J 
Toynbee in his work A Study of 
History asserts that Russia by 
embracing communism in 1917 
saved its civilisation from being 
“arrested” by alien forces.
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Katzenstein and Nicole Weygandt, “Mapping Eurasia in an Open World: How the Insularity of Russia’s Geopolitical 
and Civilisational Approaches Limits its Foreign Policies”, Perspectives on Politics, vol15, no2, 2017, pp428–42) 
They developed the idea in the context of a conflict of civilisations, as most 
Western historians regarded Russia as part of Western civilisation. However, for 
Slavophiles, Russia was a part of Slavic civilisation with its cultural and ethnic 
genesis in Asia. (Vera Tolz, Russia’s Own Orient: The Politics of Identity and Oriental Studies in the Late Imperial and 
Early Soviet Periods, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) Today, neo-Eurasianists have widened 
this paradigm by placing Russia in the broader civilisational context of cultural 
and ethnic hybridity between Eurasian communities and Russian Slavs. (Bassin, 
2003, ibid) For them, Russia is both Slavic and non-Slavic and includes multiple 
ethnic groups such as Celts, Mongols, Scandinavians and Turks. (Victor A Shnirelman, 
“Myths of Descent: Views of the Remote Past, as Reflected in School Textbooks in Contemporary Russia”, Public 
Archaeology, vol3, no1, 2003, pp33–51)
Eurasianists have also navigated Russian civilisation along certain ideological 
and philosophical paradigms by reiterating its ethno-cultural uniqueness in 
a modified geopolitical narrative. (Katzenstein and Weygandt, ibid) The discourse of a 
separate Russian culture and morality first emerged in 1848, when revolutions 
swept across the European continent except in Russia. (Alexander Lukin, “Russia between 
East and West”, Medjunarodni Problemi/International Problems, vol55, no2, 2003, pp159–85) Russian diplomat 
and poet Fyodor Tyutchev (1803–73), in Revolution and Russia divided Europe 
between two ideological forces. He emphasised the geographical specificity of 
Russia and predicted a battle between a degenerate Europe and Russia in the 
future. For Tyutchev, the ideological battle was to be in the political and religious 
domains and would decide the fate of the human realm for centuries to come. 
(Nikolaĭ Berdi︠a︡ev, The Russian Idea, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979) That is, the ideological struggle 
between revolutionary Europe and Russia was to be in the cosmic dimension 
and would determine the eschatological outcome. In this cosmic struggle, Russia 
would represent the realm of Christianity and Europe with its revolutionary 
fervour the anti-Christ. (Mikhail Suslov, “Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European 
East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol53, no5, 2012, pp575–95) Europe’s 
degeneracy in the wake of revolutions provided a clear narrative to Slavophiles to 
assert Russia’s superiority over Europe.
The discourse of Russian civilisational and cultural supremacy was not 
confined to Slavophiles. Even pro-Western Russian intellectuals such as 
Alexander Herzen expressed disenchantment with revolution from Europe. For 
him, the wave of revolutions across the continent represented the degeneration 
of European modernity and civilisation. According to Herzen, Europe had 
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destroyed itself while Russia needed to choose its own path to save the realm of 
humanity. (Shlomo Avineri, “A Note: Moses Hess on Alexander Herzen’s Vision of Russia’s Future Emancipatory 
Role in European History”, Government and Opposition, vol18, no4, 1983, pp482–90) At the beginning of 
the twentieth century, Western historian Oswald Spengler also predicted the 
decline of Western civilisation and a looming cosmic ideological confrontation. 
(Georg G Iggers, “The Idea of Progress: A Critical Reassessment”, The American Historical Review, vol71, no1, 1965, 
pp1–17) In his work, The Decline of the 
West Spengler used the philological 
approach to deconstruct the modernity 
of the West and warned of an impending 
confrontation across the civilisational 
domain. According to him, the West 
with its pseudo-modernity had lost 
its moral and cultural identity by 
morphing into morbid materialism. 
Thus, decline was the fate of Europe, 
just as it had been for other civilisations 
such as the Eskimo, Greek and Roman. 
Russia as an offshoot of Eastern 
Orthodox Christendom refused to 
accept Western modernity. The self-
identification of the Muscovites was 
based on the dictum “as chosen by 
God to protect the true faith after the 
fall of Constantinople and eventually build a world empire around that true 
faith”. Thus, while the democracy and industrialisation of the West failed to 
bring Russia under its yoke, the posture of Orthodox Christendom in Russia also 
rigidly opposed Western “enlightened” civilisation. 
Later, communism in Russia acted as a “zealot” or “proselyte” and successfully 
kept the country away from the West based on ideological differences. (Arnold J 
Toynbee and DC Somervell, A Study of History: Volume I: Abridgement of Volumes I–VI, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) Communism nurtured an anti-Western attitude among the people. 
As an ideology, it clashed with Western capitalism and resisted attempts to 
integrate Russia into Western society. (Yana Hashamova, Pride and Panic: Russian Imagination of the 
West in Post-Soviet Film, Bristol: Intellect, 2007) In contemporary discourse, in the post-Soviet 
era, Eurasianists have developed a similar counter ideology to compete with the 
Oswald Spengler used the 
philological approach to 
deconstruct the modernity 
of the West and warned of 
an impending confrontation 
across the civilisational domain. 
According to him, the West with 
its pseudo-modernity had lost 
its moral and cultural identity 
by morphing into morbid 
materialism. Thus, decline was 
the fate of Europe, just as it 
had been for other civilisations 
such as the Eskimo, Greek and 
Roman.
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United States of America (US) led Atlantic order. (Heikki Patomäki and Christer Pursiainen, 
“Western Models and the ‘Russian Idea’: Beyond ‘Inside/Outside’ in Discourses on Civil Society”, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies, vol28, no1, 1999, pp53–77) For neo-Eurasianists, the US is the Carthage 
of the twenty-first century, which must be destroyed to rescue humanity from 
civilisational collapse. The following sections analyse contemporary Russia’s 
role in the reintegration of the post-Soviet space through a neo-Eurasianist 
geopolitical approach, which provides the ideological justification for Russia as 
a multiethnic state. The geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder, Nicholas 
Spykman and Karl Haushofer have influenced the geostrategic thinking of 
Russian neo-Eurasianists. The geopolitical doctrines of the early twentieth 
century such as the Heartland Theory and Rimland Thesis remain important 
for Eurasianists in developing the Russian school of geopolitics. The dynamics 
of current Russian foreign policy in the light of present day geopolitics are also 
examined with a focus on Russia’s presumptive vocation as a Eurasian hegemonic 
saviour, striving to mend the broken geographical and spiritual ties with other 
nations in the Eurasian region.
THE REBIRTH OF EURASIANISM
As a strategic country on the vast Eurasian landmass, Russia’s geopolitical thinking has always vacillated between Europe and Asia. (Deborah W Larson and Alexei 
Shevchenko, “Russia says No: Power, Status and Emotions in Foreign Policy”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 
vol47, nos3–4, 2014, pp269–79) Since the fall of the Soviet Union, domestic politics have 
been hampered by conflicts between communists, Eurasianists and Westerners. 
The fall of communism gave birth to political nostalgia, propelling Eurasianists 
to dominate the Russian political scene. (Andrei P Tsygankov, “Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s 
Geopolitical Thinking after the Soviet Breakup”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol36, no1, 2003, pp101–
27) Eurasianists advocate the reintegration of the post-Soviet space with Russia 
to restore its geographical and geopolitical uniqueness in the greater Eurasian 
region. (Petr Savitsky, “Geopolitical and Geographical Foundations of Eurasianism (1933)”, Geopolitika, 2007, 
pp235–42 and online at https://eurasianist-archive.com) With the fall of communism, Eurasianism 
also became a popular discourse across the post-Soviet space especially in Central 
Asia. (Peter JS Duncan, “Westernism, Eurasianism and Pragmatism: The Foreign Policies of the Post-Soviet States, 
1991–2001” in Wendy Slater and Andrew Wilson (Eds), The Legacy of the Soviet Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, pp228–53)
The history of the concept of Eurasia dates back to the rule of Peter the Great 
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who won the war against Sweden and incorporated large European territories 
into imperial Russia. The geographical addition on the western frontier added 
to the uniqueness of Russia as a strategic multicultural flat land between Europe 
and Asia. (Tsygankov, 2003, ibid) In the nineteenth century, Russian scholar Nikolai 
Danilevsky (1822–85) introduced the word Eurasia as a vast unique geographical 
space, separate from both Europe and Asia. He expanded the geographical 
realm of Eurasia by elevating its 
territorial horizons to include the 
mountain ranges of the Alps, the 
Caucasus and the Himalayas as well 
as the vast external water bodies that 
form the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans. Danilevsky also declared the 
inner waters of the Baltic, Black and 
Caspian seas as strategic parts of inner 
Eurasia inherently determining its 
geographical uniqueness. (Mark Entin and 
Ekaterina Entina, “The New Role of Russia in the Greater 
Eurasia”, Strategic Analysis, vol40, no6, 2016, pp590–603) 
As a political concept, Eurasia refers to 
a geopolitical ideology of the territorial and spiritual connection between the 
communities across the vast steppes of Europe and Asia. (Bassin, 2003, ibid) In this 
regard, some Eurasianists believe that the cultural and religious ties between 
the Eastern Slavs, Turanian and Turkic communities are essential elements of 
Russian history. (Shnirelman, ibid) This interconnection was articulated ideologically 
by Russian historian and Eurasianist Lev Gumilev who considered Eurasia as a 
synthesis of European and Asian principles. For Gumilev, the Eurasian civilisation 
was the product of centuries old harmony and interconnections among diverse 
Eurasian communities. (Bassin, 2003, ibid)
The early Eurasian thinkers perceived the term Eurasia as the core of the 
centuries old hybrid continent, neither Europe nor Asia but representing the 
centre of the world due to ancient interconnections between East European, 
Siberian, Caucasian and Central Asian communities. (Graham Smith, “The Masks of 
Proteus: Russia, Geopolitical Shift and the New Eurasianism”, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, vol24, 
no4, 1999, pp481–94) For them Eurasia was a unifier, a true “middle” of the world, 
representing a strong connection between the European and Asian peripheries 
The early Eurasian thinkers 
perceived the term Eurasia as the 
core of the centuries old hybrid 
continent, neither Europe 
nor Asia but representing the 
centre of the world, a unifier, 
a true “middle” of the world, 
representing a strong connection 
between the European and Asian 
peripheries of the old world—a 
true symbol of classical legacy.
R U S S I A N  G E O P O L I T I C S  A N D  E U R A S I A
W O R L D   A F F A I R S  S U M M E R   2 0 2 0  ( A P R I L  –  J U N E )  V O L  2 4   N O   296
of the old world—a true symbol of classical legacy. (Savitsky, ibid) Eurasian identity 
was indivisible or unbreakable as it was inherently and naturally an integrated 
entity. (Igor Torbakov, “A Parting of Ways: The Kremlin Leadership and Russia’s New Generation Nationalist 
Thinkers”, Demokratizatsiya, vol23, no4, 2015, pp427–57) Russia’s geopolitical position on the vast 
Eurasian landmass forces it to reclaim the realm of Eurasian civilisation, as the 
Eurasianism of the Russian civilisation provides a basis for new intercivilisational 
international relations. (Bassin, 2003, ibid) The Eurasian nature of Russia is also a 
symbol of strength, representing a civilisational diversity necessary for the 
geopolitical stability of the Eurasian region. (Marlène Laruelle, “The Two Faces of Contemporary 
Eurasianism: An Imperial Version of Russian Nationalism”, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 
vol32, no1, 2004, pp115–36)
After the collapse of Soviet communism, neo-Eurasianists gained significant 
political influence in domestic politics. Their anti-Western attitude led them 
to advocate a complete detachment from the West to maintain the Eurasian 
identity. (Duncan, ibid) Neo-Eurasianists have broadened the theoretical domain of 
Eurasianism based on the theory of ethno-genesis by asserting a Russian identity 
in the anthropological discourse of Indo-European identity. (Mark Bassin, “The Emergence 
of Ethno-Geopolitics in Post-Soviet Russia”, Eurasian Geography and Economics, vol50, no2, 2009, pp131–49) In 
the 1990s, Aleksandr Dugin became a well-known face of the Russian Eurasian 
project who advocated the creation of a “supra-national empire” in which ethnic 
Russians would occupy a privileged position. (Laruelle, 2004, ibid) For Dugin, there 
was a shared identity between Russia and the countries of East Europe and 
Central Asia and the geographic unity of the Eurasian continent was a symbol 
of centuries old political reality. To achieve Dugin’s dream, Russia needed to 
ensure strategic balancing in the Eurasian region by keeping Chinese and Iranian 
influence at bay. Dugin called China a dangerous neighbour and proposed Russia 
create a buffer zone around Tibet, Mongolia, Xinxiang and Manchuria to keep 
China away from Russian borders. (Şener Aktürk, “The Fourth Style of Politics: Eurasianism as a 
Pro-Russian Rethinking of Turkey’s Geopolitical Identity”, Turkish Studies, vol16, no1, 2015, pp54–79) Similarly, 
Iran also has huge stakes in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Russia’s south) and 
Dugin advocated that Russia forge a grand alliance with Turania to establish a 
buffer zone between itself and the Islamic south. Neo-Eurasianism embraces 
nationalist politics and proposes a new type of sovereignty within the Russian 
Federation for the various nationalities in the post-Soviet space. (Andrei P Tsygankov, 
“Finding a Civilisational Idea: The ‘West’, ‘Eurasia’ and the ‘Euro-East’ in Russia’s Foreign Policy”, Geopolitics, vol12, 
no3, 2007, pp375–99) Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Eurasianists have 
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advocated an anti-Western policy and urged government officials not to be 
dependent on Western economic and military assistance. (Smith, ibid) 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS
The Great Game of the nineteenth century between the British and Russian empires for control of the Eurasian heartland gave birth to its geopolitical 
discourse. (Ronald Hyam, “The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics of British Imperial Policy 1763–1963”, 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol27, 
no2, 1999, pp27–52) Geographers were the 
first to speculate about the geopolitical 
significance of the Eurasian region. 
British geographer Halford Mackinder 
called the Eurasian heartland the 
geographical pivot of the world and 
warned the British Empire about 
imperial Russia’s strategic outreach 
for warm waters. For Mackinder, 
whoever controlled East Europe 
would command the heartland, 
whoever controlled the heartland 
would command the world island and 
whoever controlled the world island 
would command the world. In his 
famous study The Geographical Pivot of 
History published in 1902, Mackinder 
warned about Russian ambitions in the 
Eurasian heartland, which would make it the strongest land power on Earth. His 
paper presented to the Royal Geographical Society warned the British crown 
about Russian control of Central Asia and northern Afghanistan. He used the 
term “geographical pivot” to describe the buffer zone between the Russian and 
British empires and included the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Mackinder argued that if Russia reached Afghanistan a direct confrontation 
could ensue with the British Empire in India. Two major geopolitical concepts 
later evolved from Mackinder’s hypothesis—the implications of the concept of 
For Halford Mackinder, whoever 
controlled East Europe would 
command the heartland, whoever 
controlled the heartland would 
command the world island and 
whoever controlled the world 
island would command the world. 
In the wake of the Second World 
War, Mackinder broadened his 
analysis by claiming that if the 
Soviet Union appeared as the 
vanquisher of Germany, it would 
become the biggest land power. 
The heartland would make 
the Russian army an invincible 
garrison on the globe.
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the Great Game and the warm waters narrative. In the wake of the Second World 
War, Mackinder broadened his analysis by claiming that if the Soviet Union 
appeared as the vanquisher of Germany, it would become the biggest land power 
with a strategically defendable position. The heartland as the biggest natural 
fortress on Earth would make the Russian army an invincible garrison on the 
globe. (Tuğçe Varol Sevim, “Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or Coming Reality”, Eurasian Journal of Business 
and Economics, vol6, no12, 2013, pp43–62)
The domain of geopolitics deals with the strategic location of a country 
and its associated capabilities, opportunities and resources. The geopolitics of a 
state accounts for the struggle for power in the global system by the projection 
of capabilities through statecraft and available resources. Geopolitics is the 
worldview developed by a state for self-positioning and self-projection in the 
international system as a stakeholder. (Virginie Mamadouh and Gertjan Dijkink, “Geopolitics, 
International Relations and Political Geography: The Politics of Geopolitical Discourse”, Geopolitics, vol11, no3, 2006, 
pp349–66) Swedish political scientist Johan Rudolf Kjellén coined the term geopolitik, 
later transformed and developed by German geographers Frederick Ratzel and 
Karl Haushofer. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the discourse of 
geopolitics was broadened by Mackinder and the American geographer Nicholas 
Spykman. (Atsuko Watanabe, “Greater East Asia Geopolitics and its Geopolitical Imagination of a Borderless 
World: A Neglected Tradition”, Political Geography, vol67, 2018, pp23–31) Later, with the onset of the 
Cold War between the Soviet Union and the US, American geostrategists like 
Zbigniew Brzezinski adopted and adapted the term “geopolitics”. (Alexandros Petersen, 
The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011)
American geographer Nicholas Spykman pioneered the Rimland Theory 
by modifying Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, which was limited to the domain 
of land based imperial control and dominance. Mackinder had illustrated the 
geographical relationship between two neighbouring continents Europe and 
Asia. He saw it as a single continent, a continuous landmass with ice-girths in 
the north and water-girths in the south covering an area of twenty-one million 
square miles. Spykman modified Mackinder’s thesis with his rimland dictum 
of “who controls the rimland rules Eurasia and who rules Eurasia controls the 
destinies of the world”. (Robert D Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, New York: Random House, 2013) 
Rimland refers to the vast rich resources and inner sea-lanes or strategic trade 
routes in the peripheral areas of the Eurasian continent. Spykman projected 
the importance of the Eurasian rimland for maritime hegemony in the world. 
For him, although the Atlanticists relied on sea power, if they failed to control 
the Eurasian rimland, they would lose the war against Russia. Thus, Spykman 
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saw the coastal areas of West, South, Southeast and East Asia as strategically 
significant for controlling Eurasia and a means of keeping an eye on the land 
power of Russia. (Colin S Gray, “Nicholas John Spykman, the Balance of Power and International Order”, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, vol38, no6, 2015, pp873–97)
For Mackinder, Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia formed the “pivot” 
area around which the fate of empires would rely—what he called the heartland. 
As a founder of modern geopolitics, Mackinder summarised the discipline 
of geopolitics as “man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure 
controls”. (Geoffrey Sloan, “Sir Halford J Mackinder: The Heartland Theory Then and Now”, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol22, nos2–3, 1999, pp15–38) Likewise, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Blue Water Theory 
in the late nineteenth–early twentieth 
century had declared the sea as the 
“commons” of civilisations and stated 
that naval power was a decisive factor 
in global politics. For Mahan, “whoever 
controls the oceans, rules the destinies 
of the world” and therefore for him 
the Indian and Pacific oceans were 
important geopolitical arenas. (Kaplan, 
ibid) He anticipated the Indian Ocean 
to be the epicentre of the geopolitical 
competition between major powers. 
Mahan also coined the term Middle 
East by emphasising the sea-lanes between Arabia and India as significant for 
naval strategy, maritime security and imperial hegemony. Mahan’s Blue Waters 
Theory was adapted as the Domino Theory in the 1950s and became part of 
the US’s containment strategy during the Cold War. The theory projected the 
expansion of communism through a domino effect in other nations of the Asia–
Pacific, threatening US maritime hegemony in the Pacific Ocean.
After the fall of the Soviet Union, these geopolitical theories compelled Russia 
to reiterate its geopolitical position as a Eurasian power. Dugin laid the foundations 
of Russian geopolitics through his work The Foundation of Geopolitics, taught 
in Russian military schools today. (Alan Ingram, “Aleksandr Dugin: Geopolitics and Neo-Fascism 
in Post-Soviet Russia”, Political Geography, vol20, no8, 2001, pp1029–51) The geopolitical treatise has 
political and strategic significance for Russian foreign policy as with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the country suffered from political nostalgia for a prolonged 
The fall of the Soviet Union 
forced foreign policy circles 
to devise a new multivector 
approach to reintegration. The 
Russian geopolitical vision of a 
Eurasian Union represented a new 
regionalisation process as a barrier 
to the influx of external powers 
in the post-Soviet space—a clear 
example being China’s peaceful 
rise in Central Asia.
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period of time. For Dugin, the New Great Game had already begun with new 
geopolitical players at the heart of Eurasia—a strategic threat to Russia’s sphere 
of influence in the post-Soviet space. (John B Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s Foundation of Geopolitics”, 
Demokratizatsiya, vol12, no1, 2004) Russia’s Eurasian identity came under severe threat from 
new alliances formed in the greater Eurasian region. (Jacob W Kipp, “Aleksandr Dugin and 
the Ideology of National Revival: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and the Conservative Revolution”, European Security, vol11, 
no3, 2002, pp91–125) Dugin proposed a Eurasia-centric foreign policy to reinvigorate 
Russian influence in the post-Soviet space through a series of economic and 
political collaborative agreements.
The main objective of Russian geopolitics has been to advance the process of 
economic integration of the post-Soviet space from the Baltic Sea to the Yellow 
Sea. The new economic conditions and collapse of Soviet security infrastructure 
pushed Russian leadership to reshape the geographic security of Eurasia. (Mikhail 
A Molchanov, Regionalisation from Above: Russia’s Asia “Vector” and the State led Regionalism in Eurasia, 2009, online at 
https://www.researchgate.net) In addition, the dawn of the twenty-first century marked 
a new era of regionalism across the globe with multidimensional interstate 
integration across cultural, economic, political and security spheres. The fall of the 
Soviet Union forced foreign policy circles to devise a new multivector approach 
to reintegration. (Maria Lagutina, “Eurasian Economic Union Foundation: Issues of Global Regionalisation”, 
Eurasia Border Review, vol5, no1, 2014, pp95–111) The new regionalism was influenced by the 
rising development and security concerns of major powers in the surrounding 
regions. (Shaun Breslin, Christopher W Hughes, Nicola Phillips and Ben Rosamond (Eds), New Regionalism in the 
Global Political Economy: Theories and Cases, London: Routledge, 2002) Thus, the Russian geopolitical 
vision of a Eurasian Union represented a new regionalisation process as a barrier 
to the influx of external powers in the post-Soviet space—a clear example being 
China’s peaceful rise in Central Asia. (Marcin Kaczmarski, “Non-Western Visions of Regionalism: 
China’s New Silk Road and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union”, International Affairs, vol93, no6, 2017, pp1357–76)
RUSSIA AND EURASIAN INTEGRATION
The fall of the Soviet Union marked a new beginning in three major sub-Eurasian regions. After the dissolution, Russia emerged as the largest and 
most stable state among the newly independent post-Soviet states of Eastern 
Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The catastrophic Soviet disintegration 
also engendered major economic problems for the newly independent states. (Evgeny 
Vinokurov and Alexander Libman, Eurasian Integration Challenges of Transcontinental Regionalism, London: Palgrave 
S H A H Z A D A  R A H I M  A B B A S
101W O R L D   A F F A I R S  S U M M E R   2 0 2 0  ( A P R I L  –  J U N E )  V O L  2 4   N O   2
Macmillan, 2014) Facing dire economic challenges, the creation of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the Interstate Economic Committee, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly and a set of new trade agreements were intended to ensure an initial 
peaceful breakup with a fair distribution of assets. Along with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan supported the creation 
of the commonwealth and other 
regional projects with neo-regionalism 
aspirations. (Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, 
“The Commonwealth of Independent States 1991–98: 
Stagnation and Survival”, Europe–Asia Studies, vol51, no3, 
1999, pp379–415) The term neo-regionalism 
came into global discourse after the 
fall of the Soviet Union, describing 
a new pattern of regional integration 
across administrative, cultural, 
economic and political spheres. Russia’s 
Eurasian project with a neo-Eurasianist 
foreign policy aims at achieving neo-
regionalisation in the greater Eurasian 
area in the form of a Eurasian Union, 
a Eurasian Economic Union and a 
Eurasian Customs Union.
The creation of a Eurasian Union manifest the collective vision of the leaders 
of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan who saw the reintegration of the post-Soviet 
space as indispensable for security. For them, Eurasia is the historical space of 
Russia and its peripheries and their geographical and sociocultural unity. (S Frederick 
Starr and Svante E Cornell (Eds), Putin’s Grand Strategy: The Eurasian Union and Its Discontents, Institute for Security and 
Development Policy, Stockholm, 2014, online at https://isdp.eu) The concept of an intergovernmental 
and supranational entity encompassing the Russian Federation and the countries 
in the post-Soviet space demonstrated a clear agenda for a neo-regionalisation 
process. The initial proposal for the establishment of a Eurasian Union came 
from the former President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev who perceived 
the integration project as a gradual process across economic, humanitarian and 
political spheres. (James Kilner, “Kazakhstan Welcomes Putin’s Eurasian Union Concept”, The Telegraph, 6 
October 2011, online at https://www.telegraph.co.uk) According to American Eurasianism expert 
Marlène Laruelle, (Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps, Ponars Eurasia, 
Policy Memo 366, July 2015, online at http://www.ponarseurasia.org) there is a close overlap between 
With China’s announcement 
of its Belt and Road Initiative, 
Russia looked to it for a 
trustworthy partner to build 
new economic ties across 
Eurasia. The Chinese initiative 
comprises major economic 
and logistics projects for the 
twenty-first century. The New 
Great Game envisages China’s 
growing influence in the Central 
Asian region as a strategic threat 
for Russia, which needs to be 
counterbalanced with shared 
geopolitical interests.
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a Eurasian Union and the ideology of neo-Eurasianism as the latter provides the 
ideological foundations for the Eurasian project. For Laruelle, the geographical 
and geopolitical aspects of the term Eurasia are closely associated with the term 
Euraziski, which refers to a person of mixed European and Asian descent. She 
has highlighted the special relationship between Eurasia, Russian Eurasianism 
and the Eurasian Union project.
Since 2000, Russia has played an active role in Eurasian integration with 
support from Belarus and Kazakhstan. The vision for a Eurasian Union 
dominated the Russian political scene during the 2012 presidential elections, 
when Vladimir Putin and his United Russia Party formally announced their 
support for the integration project. (Starr and Cornell, ibid) The announcement was 
welcomed in Kazakhstan as Nazarbayev had always personally supported 
closer economic integration of the post-Soviet countries with Russia. (Kilner, ibid) 
The proposal for the Eurasian Union was made in 1996, when the Treaty on 
Deepening Integration in Economic and Humanitarian Areas came into force 
through a multilateral dialogue between the representatives of the Russian 
Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. (Paul Pryce, “Putin’s Third Term: The Triumph 
of Eurasianism”, Romanian Journal of European Affairs, vol13, no1, 2013)
Russia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin (“A New Integration Project for Eurasia: 
The Future in the Making”, Izvestia, 3 October 2011, online at https://russiaeu.ru) has always supported 
close cooperation between Europe and Asia, with the aim of creating a common 
economic space with the European Union and Eurasian Economic Union, like 
Mikhail Gorbachev before him. Putin has advanced the concept of a greater 
European community from Lisbon to Vladivostok stretching along a common 
economic and political space. The idea of greater Eurasia was also speculated upon 
by German geopolitical scientist Karl Haushofer who in the wake of World War 
Two called for a geopolitical bloc between the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan 
against the Anglo-Saxon marine civilisation. A similar idea was also contemplated 
by French President Charles de Gaulle in the 1950s when he called for the creation 
of a greater European Community from “the Atlantic to the Urals”. (Anatoly Tsvyk, 
“‘Greater Europe’ or ‘Greater Eurasia’: In Search of New Ideas for the Eurasian Integration”, RUDN Journal of Sociology, 
vol18, no2, 2018, pp262–70) The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) expansion 
eastwards soon became a major hurdle in Russia–European Union cooperation. 
On several occasions, Russian foreign policy circles urged Europe not to breach 
the trust between the two by supporting NATO’s expansion. (“Was NATO’s Eastward 
Expansion a Broken Promise”, Offiziere.ch, 28 December 2018, online at https://www.offiziere.ch)
With China’s announcement of its Belt and Road Initiative, Russia looked 
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to it for a trustworthy partner to build new economic ties across Eurasia. The 
Chinese initiative comprises major economic and logistics projects for the 
twenty-first century such as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime 
Silk Route. (Tsvyk, ibid) These are vast sprawling transport and logistics networks 
across Eurasia and include airports, gas and oil pipelines, highways and railway 
lines. In 2017, the Eurasian Economic Union Commission listed some priority 
projects in cooperation with the 
Chinese initiative including upgrading 
existing routes and the construction of 
new logistics centres. (Denis A Degterev, Li Yan 
and Alexandra A Trusova, “Russian and Chinese Systems 
of Development Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis”, 
Vestnik RUDN International Relations, vol17, no4, 2017, 
pp824–38) Due to geostrategic challenges 
posited by NATO and its European 
supporters, Russia has turned towards 
greater Eurasia or the common 
economic space between Europe, the 
Eurasian Economic Union countries 
and Asia. (Peter Havlik, The Silk Road: Challenges 
for the European Union and Eurasia, Wiener Institut für 
Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, 1 December 2015, online at https://wiiw.ac.at) Moreover, the New 
Great Game envisages China’s growing influence in the Central Asian region 
as a strategic threat for Russia, which needs to be counterbalanced with shared 
geopolitical interests. (Petar Kurečić, “The New Great Game: Rivalry of Geostrategies and Geoeconomies in 
Central Asia”, Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik/Croatian Geographical Bulletin, vol72, no1, 2010, pp21–46)
Thus, the Eurasian economic integration project is a multidimensional 
attempt by Russia and its close allies in the Eurasian region to establish a new 
association by erecting common institutions and norms. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union gave birth to new geopolitical uncertainties and compelled Russia 
to find alternative ways to promote its interests in the Eurasian region. (Alexander 
Lukin and Vladimir Yakunin, “Eurasian Integration and the Development of Asiatic Russia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, 
vol9, no2, 2018, pp100–13) Accordingly, the Russian initiatives of a Eurasian Union and 
the Eurasian Economic Union are aimed at the reintegration of the post-Soviet 
space with Russia. Several Russian Eurasian projects through a “soft” balancing 
strategy are endeavouring to counter the Atlanticists influence in the Eurasian 
region and project a new “soft” image of Russia as a superpower.
R U S S I A N  G E O P O L I T I C S  A N D  E U R A S I A
The Russian initiative of Eurasian 
integration has found support 
amongst several countries in the 
post-Soviet space. The modus 
operandi is multidimensional 
and contemporary Russian 
geopolitics favours détente as the 
country attempts to reintegrate 
the post-Soviet space of Central 
Asia and Eastern Europe across 
economic, humanitarian and 
political spheres.
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CONCLUSION
Contemporary Russian foreign policy is based on the economic challenges and existential security threats facing the state. The Russian initiative of Eurasian 
integration has found support amongst several countries in the post-Soviet space. 
The modus operandi is multidimensional and contemporary Russian geopolitics 
favours détente as the country attempts to reintegrate the post-Soviet space of 
Central Asia and Eastern Europe across economic, humanitarian and political 
spheres. Since 2000, Russia has played an active role through various economic 
initiatives such as the Eurasian Customs Union, the Eurasian Development 
Bank and the Eurasian Economic Union. Pro-Russian regimes in East Europe 
and Central Asia today face various domestic problems. For instance Belarus, 
which is suffering from dire economic challenges, is still ruled by the pro-Russia 
strongman Alexander Lukashenko, whose regime has been criticised by the West 
for its undemocratic rule. Despite this, Lukashenko has struck a new deal with 
Russia on gas pipelines. Kazakhstan too is an important ally of Russia in the 
Central Asian region. It has always supported the Eurasian project and is a key 
state in the Russian sphere of influence. However, it too is facing economic 
and political challenges that could disrupt the pace of Eurasian integration. 
Nevertheless, Russia continues to play an important role in Eurasian integration. 
The Eurasian Union seems to be evolving and for it, the trajectory of Russia’s 
foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is pertinent. Thus, Russia’s multivectoral 
foreign policy approach aims to build new economic and security architecture 
for the integration of the post-Soviet space.
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